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to vote is otherwise limited by the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 this decision
would seem to render statutes concerning geographical distribution of po-
litical strength outside the pale of judicial censure.2") The only issue was
whether injunctive relief was practicable and wise. A decree enjoining
the operation of the county unit system would have impinged upon Georgia's
elective process only after all ballots had been cast; it would have required
that equal weight be given to each ballot. The popular vote would then
have determined the outcome of the election. No embarrassment or diffi-
culty of enforcement is apparent. Since relief might well have been proper,
the Court should have justified their denial by analysis of the facts.
LANDOWNER'S LIABILITY FOR INFANT DROWNING IN
ARTIFICIAL POND
Since its introduction some seventy years ago, the proposition that a
landowner may be liable to trespassing children who are injured by dangerous
artificial conditions on the land, under circumstances where an adult could not
recover, has had an interesting history. A recent Indiana Supreme Court deci-
sion on one of the specific applications of this "attractive nuisance" doctrine-
the liability for the drowning of a child trespasser in an artificial body of
water-was Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana.' The complaint for
wrongful death alleged that the defendant left unguarded on its land an arti-
ficial pond in view of the street in a residential section of Hammond, Indiana.
Although the bottom was littered with debris and broken by abrupt drop-of fs
which were invisible through the murky water, the defendant took no steps to
warn the large groups of children known to be attracted there frequently to
27. See note 1 supra.
28. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938), it was
pointed out that the presumption of validity may have a narrower scope in regard to
statutes regulating non-economic rights embraced within the first ten amendments and
the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). Mac
Dougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) would seem to give this presumption a broader
scope where the regulation of non-economic rights embodies the principle that government
is not purely a matter of majority rule. See note 5 supra. This is understandable and
defensible because that principle is embodied in the Federal Constitution, which awards
each state equal representation in the Senate regardless of population. U.S. CONST.
AMEND. XVIII, § 1; ART. I, §§ 2, 3. However, the analogy is incomplete when it is
applied to political subdivisions within the state, because it presupposes the relation be-
tween county and state to be similar to that between state and federal government. See
note 9 supra. It forgets that the Federal Constitution was created to perfect a union of
thirteen separate, distinct, and independent sovereignties while the Georgia counties are
mere divisions for the more efficient operation of a single state government. GA. CoNsT.
ART. XI, § 1. South v..Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950), goes to an extreme in that it does not
give effect to the policy of Mac Dougall v. Green, supra, nor does it pass upon the consti-
tutionality of the statute in question, but renders it unassailable regardless of its
constitutionality.
1. 92 N.E.2d 632 (Ind. 1950) ; petition for rehearing denied, Oct. 4, 1950.
NOTES
swim. Among those attracted was the plaintiff's eleven-year-old son, who
went swimming without his mother's knowledge. He was drowned when he
stepped into a drop-off of which he was unaware. A demurrer for want of
facts sufficient to state a cause of action was sustained and a judgment for the
defendant affirmed, two judges dissenting. Starr, J., for the majority, held
that a body of water was not an attractive nuisance because children are
presumed to know the dangers of water.2
In 1873, in Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout,' the United States Supreme
Court, disregarding the old rule that a landowner owes no duty to trespassers
in regard to risks arising from the condition of the premises, 4 imposed re-
sponsibility upon a railroad for negligently exposing a dangerous artificial
condition (an unlocked turntable) to the curiosity of a trespassing child.
5
Indiana readily accepted this inroad upon the landowner's "immunity"6 and
for twenty years ruled broadly that he could not with impunity create a
dangerous condition which made injury to children probable.
7
The obvious conflict between the extension and the general rule ,induced
courts to seek an adequate doctrinal rationale. Instead of positing liability on
foreseeability of the risk and acknowledging the conflict, they resorted to a
fiction-an invitation implied in law from an unnecessary exposure of some
dangerous and alluring artificial condition with which children were prompted
to meddle. This has become the traditional statement of the "attractive
nuisance" doctrine."
The new theoretical basis of liability was first asserted in Indiana in two
railroad turntable cases,9 which aptly fitted the "invitation" formula since the
2. Id. at 634.
3. 17 Wall. 657 (1873).
4. Knapp v. Doll, 180 Ind. 526, 103 N.E. 385 (1913); Evansville & T. H. R.R. v.
Griffin, 100 Ind. 221 (1884) ; Lary v. Cleveland, C. C. & I. R.R., 78 Ind. 323 (1881).
See also Indianapolis v. Emmelman, 108 Ind. 530, 533, 9 N.E. 155, 156 (1886) ; City of
Elwood v. Addison, 26 Ind. App. 28, 31, 59 N.E. 47, 48 (1901).
5. See Townes, Is a Restatement of the Law as to Liability Arising from Dangerous
Premises Desirable and Practicable?, 1 TEx. L. REv. 1, 3 (1922). In blandly disregarding
the old rule, the Court did not view the decision "as a great innovation." Hudson, The
Turntab'" Coses in the Federal Courts, 36 HARv. L. REv. 826, 829 (1923).
6. Binfora v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 426, 430 (1882). Two earlier cases, Young v. Harvey,
16 Ind. 314 (1861) and Durham v. Musselman, 2 Blackf. 96 '(Ind. 1827), indicated that
Indiana courts might be receptive to such a rule in regard to children.
7. Cincinnati & Hammond Spring Co. v. Brown, 32 Ind. App. 58, 69 N.E. 197 (1903);
accord, Penso v. McCormick, 125 Ind. 116, 25 N.E. 156 (1890). Cf. South Bend v. Turner,
156 Ind. 418, 60 N.E. 271 (1900) (reversed on other grounds). See also Indianapolis,
P. & C. R.R. v. Pitzer, 109 Ind. 179, 182, 6 N.E. 310, 311 (1886) ; Binford v. Johnston, 82
Ind. 426, 430 (1882). But cf. Indianapolis v. Emmelman, 108 Ind. 530, 533-534, 9 N.E.
155, 156-157 (1886) ; City of Elwood v. Addison, 26 Ind. App. 28, 31, 59 N.E. 47, 48 (1901).
8. See, e.g., Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Means, 59 Ind. App. 383, 399, 104 N.E.
785, 790 (1915). The rationalization was probably first asserted in Keefe v. Milwaukee
& St. P. Ry., 21 Minn. 207 (1875).
9. Chicago & E. R.R. v. Fox, 38 Ind. App. 268, 70 N.E. 81 (1904) ; Lewis v. Cleveland,
C. C. & St. L. Ry., 42 Ind. App. 337, 84 N.E. 23 (1908).
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children had actually been attracted by the prospect of a merry-go-round ride.
But the logical implications of the rule restricted the possibility of recovery
within a narrow factual compass: the child could recover only if he had been
both induced to trespass and injured by a condition determined to be peculiarly
alluring to children.' 0 Although the theory favored in Indiana today is not
clear," the many cases in which a child has successfully sued for injuries
suffered while trespassing indicates that the courts of the state have been
unwilling to adhere to the implications of the attractive nuisance theory
where their effect is to limit too narrowly the rights of the child.
Thus the 1915 case of Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Means 2 presented
a situation not literally within the doctrinal terms since the injury was not
caused by the condition which enticed the child to trespass, but resulted from
the defendant's separate "affirmative" conduct. A child gathering wheat
from beneath railroad cars on a siding where children had been known to play
was killed when, in coupling operations, the defendant's trainmen suddenly
and without warning or investigation moved the cars. Hottel, J., noting the
confusion as to the landowner's duty toward intruders, decided that recovery
could be based on traditional principles of negligence.' 3 Later cases have
imposed liability for injuries from an unreasonable risk to foreseeable tres-
passing children, whether created by affirmative conduct or by a dangerous
condition, even if it "may not be what is termed an attractive nuisance. ' " The
10. See, e.g., United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Van Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922).
11. There is language in a few Indiana attractive nuisance cases which supports the
narrower limitations. See, e.g., Indianapolis Water Co. v. Harold, 170 Ind. 170, 176, 83
N.E. 993, 995 (1908) (the child was not lured by the condition until after trespassing) ;
Indianapolis Motor Speedway Co. v. Shoup, 88 Ind. App. 572, 577-578, 165 N.E. 246, 248
(1928) (the child did not discover the condition until after trespassing) ; Davis, Director
v. Keller, 85 Ind. App. 9, 17, 150 N.E. 70, 72 (1926) (a railroad right of way was thought
not peculiarly alluring to children) ; Holstine v. Director, 77 Ind. App. 582, 591, 134
N.E. 303, 306 (1922) (the child was not killed by the devices which lured him to trespass).
In each of these cases, however, the court seemed to posit its decision of no liability
on 6ther grounds. Furthermore, the early Indiana cases applying the doctrine of neg-
ligence (cases in note 7 supra) are still cited with approval, although they conflict with
the narrower limitations implicit in the literal doctrinal terms. It is doubtful whether
such limitations would be employed today where the facts of a case call strongly for
liability. For example, in Drew v. Lett, 95 Ind. App. 89, 182 N.E. 547 (1932), the de-
fendant was held liable when a child was killed by poison gas which had collected at the
mouth of a shaft on the defendant's abandoned mine works although no particular condi-
tion could be pointed to as having lured the child to trespass. For a discussion of that
case as well as the attractive nuisance doctrine in general, see 8 IND. L. J. 508 (1933).
12. 59 Ind. App. 383, 104 N.E. 785 (1915), petition for rehearing denied, 59 Ind. App.
412, 108 N.E. 375 (1915).
13. Id. at 411, 104 N.E. at 795. In support of the proposition that the landowner's
liability to children originated under the traditional doctrine of negligence see Green,
Laidozner's Responsibility to Children, 27 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1948) ; Wilson, Limitations
on the Attractive Nisance Doctrine, 1 N.C.L. Rav. 162, 169 (1923).
14. 1 TiioarpsoN, NEGLIGENCE 945 (1901). In-Indiana Harbor Belt KR. v. Jones,
220 Ind. 139, 41 N.E.2d 361 (1942), Richman, J., excellently pointed out the proposi-
tion of the Means case. See Harper, Development in the Law of Torts in Indiana 1940-
NOTES
consistently satisfactory results of the decisions indicate that the Indiana courts
have in each made a practical compromise between the interest in the protec-
tion of children and the interest in maximizing the free use of land.15
The Indiana cases, regardless of whether the rule applied can properly
be termed attractive nuisance, reveal that the elements of liability for injuries
caused children by artificial conditions on land are four: (1) The landowner
should have known that children were likely to trespass; (2) he should have
known that the condition involved serious risk of harm to children; (3) the
*injured child because of its tender years did not realize the risk; (4) the
utility to the landowner of maintaining the dangerous condition was slight
compared with the risk to the child.-6 It is of course impossible to state with
precision the comparative weight which Indiana courts have given each ele-
ment.17 There is an inverse relationship between the first two, so that as the
likelihood of a child's presence at the place of danger increases, it becomes
correspondingly easier to impose liability for injury from a condition which is
of comparatively minor danger.' The utility and degree of necessity of main-
1945, 21 IND. L.J. 447, 467-469 (1946). This rule has been termed variously as the inter-
mediate rule, Holstine v. Director, 77 Ind. App. 582, 597, 134 N.E. 303, 308 (1922), and
the habitual trespasser rule, 14 IND. L.J. 376 (1939). It has been applied chiefly against
railroads and power companies. The rule applied in the Means case has been recognized
and followed: Harris v. Indiana G. S. Co., 206 Ind. 351, 189 N. E. 410 (1933) ; Wise v.
Southern I.G. & E. Co., 109 Ind. App. 681, 34 N.E.2d 975 (1941) ; Terre Haute, I. & E.
T. Co. v. Sanders, 80 Ind. App. 16, 136 N.E. 54 (1923) ; Fort Wayne & N.I.T. Co. v. Stark,
74 Ind. App. 669, 127 N.E. 460 (1920); it has also been recognized and distinguished:
McClelland v. Baltimore & 0. C. T. R.R., 123 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Brush v. Public
Serv. Co., 106 Ind. App. 554, 21 N.E.2d 83 (1939) ; Dickerson v. Ewin, 105 Ind. App. 694,
17 N.E.2d 496 (1938); Snyder v. New York C. R.R., 101 Ind. App. 258, 194 N.E. 796
(1935) ; Davis v. Keller, 85 Ind. App. 9, 150 N.E. 70 (1926). But see Kent v. Interstate
P.S. Co., 97 Ind. App. 13, 19, 168 N.E. 465, 467 (1929) (disapproved in part by the
Wise case supra).
The fundamental proposition of both the attractive nuisance cases and those follow-
ing Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Means is that if the possibility of intruding children
at a place of danger is foreseeable, due care is required. Both lines of cases can be traced
back to the early Indiana decisions cited in note 7 supra.
15. The competition of these interests is the crux of the problem. See Bohlen, The
Duty of a Landlord Toward Those Entering His Premises of Their Own Right, 6§ U. OF
PA. L. REv. 340, 348 (1921) ; Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering With-
out Permission, 11 HARv. L. Rxv. 349, 369 (1898).
16. This classification is a rough paraphrase of RESTATEMiENT, TORTS § 339 (1934).
17. See Bauer, The Degree of Danger and the Degree of Difficulty of Removal of
the Danger as Factors in the "Attractive Nuisance" Cases, 18 MINN. L. REv. 523 (1934)
and cases cited.
18. See Cincinnati & Hammond Spring Co. v. Brown, 32 Ind. App. 58, 69 N.E. 197
(1903), where a landowner who had left parts of an unkept barbed wire fence to remain
among the underbrush of his abandoned city lot was held liable for injuries to a child
who ran against the wire during a game. The danger was not required to be great since
children had been known to use the defendant's land as a playground. See also Penso v.
McCormick, 125 Ind. 116, 25 N.E. 156 (1890) (pile of hot ashes on a lot used by the
public); Borinstein v. Hansbrough, 119 Ind. App. 134, 82 N.E. 2d 266 (1948) (pile of
heavy junk on a city lot where children played) ; Indianapolis v. Williams, 58 Ind. App.
447, 108 N.E. 387 (1915) (sewer hole in a stream bed on a playground). On the other
hand, the likelihood of the child's presence at the dargerous place has been substantially
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taining the particular condition is also a variable factor which affects the ulti-
mate decision as to the reasonableness of the landowner's conduct.'0 The courts
have not viewed the third element-inadvertence to the danger-as involving
considerations any different from the doctrine of contributory negligence as
familiarly applied to children.20  Consequently, determination of whether
the child exercised "diligence" has been left largely to the trier of fact,
21
except when the evidence showed that the child was aware of the danger.22
Measured against the foregoing four-part formula for determining liabil-
ity, it seems erroneous to say that the complaint in the Plotaki case failed to
state a cause of action. There was no dispute that the defendant should have
known that children were likely to come to its dangerous pond. The issue was
whether the child knew or should have known of the danger, and it is on this
point that the court denied recovery. Instead of leaving the question to the
trier of fact, it ruled as a matter of law that all trespassing children understand
the dangers of water.23 Authority for the ruling was found in an often quoted
dictum in Indianapolis Water Co. v. Harold,24 although that case and another,2 5
the only two Indiana precedents in point, allowed a suit for the drowning of an
less and liability still resulted where the danger was extreme to anyone contacting the
condition. Harris v. Indiana G. S. Co., 206 Ind. 351, 189 N.E. 410 (1933) (high tension
tower with defective wiring causing a short circuit) ; Fort Wayne & N. I. T. Co. v. Stark,
74 Ind. App. 669, 127 N.E. 460 (1920) (uninsulated wires running through a tree top).
19. See Indianapolis Water Co. v. Harold, 170 Ind. 170, 83 N.E. 993 (1908).
20. See, e.g., Drew v. Lett, 95 Ind. App. 89, 95, 182 N.E. 547, 549 (1932).
21. "Contributory negligence is a defense and unless it affirmatively appears the
complaint is good. . . . These were questions of fact not apparent on the face of the
complaint and therefore subject to proof and for the jury." Indiana H. B. R.R. v. Jones,
220 Ind. 139, 146-147, 41 N.E.2d 361, 364 (1942). See South Bend v. Turner, 156 Ind.
418, 423-424, 60 N.E. 271, 273-274 (1901) ; Wise v. Southern I. G. & E. Co., 109 Ind. App.
681, 693, 34 N.E.2d 975, 979 (1941). Contra: Anderson v. Reith-Riley Construction C6.,
112 Ind. App. 170, 44 N.E.2d 184 (1942).
22. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Ewin, 105 Ind. App. 694, 17 N.E.2d 496 (1938) ; Kent v.
Interstate P.S. Co., 97 Ind. App. 13, 168 N.E. 465 (1929).
In Indianapolis Water Co. v. Harold, 170 Ind. 170, 83 N.E. 993 (1908), the land-
owner was held not liable when the evidence showed among other things that a child
who drowned in the defendant's canal had been warned by adults and had discussed with
a playmate before his ill-fated venture the danger of walking on a log lying across the
water. The evidence also showed that the log was serving a beneficial purpose to the
defendant.
23. Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co. of Ind., 92 N.E.2d 632, 734 (Ind. 1950).
24. 170 Ind. 170, 177, 83 N:E. 993, 995 (1908). Two other Indiana cases have since
quoted the dictum: Evansville v. Blue, 212 Ind. 130, 140, 8 N.E.2d 224, 229 (1937);
Anderson v. Reith-Riley Construction Co., 112 Ind. App. 170, 172, 44 N. E.2d 184, 185
(1942). The unrealistic presumption that the danger of drowning is appreciated by all
children was probably first made as dicta in Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 350, 47
Pac. 113, 114 (1896) rehearing denied, 115 Cal. 355, 47 Pac. 598 (1897). That unsupported
remark was unnecessary for the decision of the case. At 20 R.C.L. 96 (1918) the dictum
is stated as the general rule throughout the nation, although most of the cases cited there
as authority do not support it. Since that time, however, an imposing body of case law
indulging in the presumption has acdumulated.
25. Indianapolis v. Williams, 58 Ind. App. 447, 108 N.E. 387 (1915) (overruled in
the Plotzki case, 92 N.E.2d 632, 634 (Ind. 1950)).
NOTES
infant trespasser. The express Indianapolis Water Co. holding was that
recovery for the drowning of an infant trespasser was possible unless the
evidence showed that the child actually recognized the peril. 6
Entirely apart from the questionability of the authority for the Plotzki
holding, it is unsound for other more cogent reasons. In the first place an
application of the premise that all children appreciate the perils of water
would necessarily preclude liability in every case of drowning where the child
had seen and voluntarily entered or played near water, even if he were right-
fully at the place where the drowning occurred, since contributory negligence
would be established as a matter of law. This, of course, has not been the
law of Indiana.2 7  A far more important objection lies in the undeniable
facts of life: if automobile accidents are excluded, drowning is perhaps the
largest single cause of accidental death to children between the ages of one
and fourteen in the United States." The inference is that children do not
appreciate the dangers of water.
29
The last element of the formula under discussion, embodying the economic
aspect of the rule, requires that the utility to the landowner of maintaining
the dangerous condition be slight compared with the risk to the child. Thus,
in the railroad turntable cases"° where the danger could readily and inexpen-
26. There plaintiff alleged that defendant negligently exposed an alluring slippery
log across the canal, that the child did not realize the danger and was drowned. A de-
murrer for failure to allege a cause of action was overruled. The subsequent trial
resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, two questions were pre-
sented: first, whether the demurrer was properly overruled; secondly, whether the evi-
dence supported the allegations. The court held on the second question that the evidence
failed to support the allegations and reversed in favor of the defendant. See note 22
supra. However, the reversal came only after the court expressly held that the allegations
were sufficient and therefore the demurrer had been properly overruled. Indianapolis
Water Co. v. Harold, 170 Ind. 170, 83 N.E. 993 (1908).
27. See, e.g., Indianapolis v. Emmelman, 108 Ind. 530, 9 N.E. 155 (1886). There
the pool in which the child drowned was in a public highway. The court pointed out that
an adult likewise, if free from fault, could recover under the same facts, implying that
the child had been free from fault. In Mayhew v. Burns, 103 Ind. 328, 2 N.E. 793 (1885),
the defendant had excavated up to the plaintiff's property line so that a pool was formed
into which the child fell and was drowned; a judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on
other grounds. And in City of Elwood v. Addison, 26 Ind. App. 28, 59 N.E. 47 (1901),
recovery was allowed for the drowning of a child in water collected in a pool adjacent to
the sidewalk due to a defective culvert. Other jurisdictions are in accord: Heitmann v.
Lake City, 225 Minn. 117, 30 N.W.2d 18 (1947) ; Mussolino v. Coxe Bros. & Co., 357 Pa.
10, 53 A.2d 93 (1947). See 20 TENN. L. REV. 765, 767 (1949). An additional argument
against the holding of the Plotzki case is that the concealed drop-offs in the bottom of
the pond added to the gravity of the danger in swimming there.
28. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL (STATISTIcAL DIVIsIoN), AccI-
DENT F.NcTs, 6-7, 16 (1950).
29. In Indiana today a landowner owes no duty of due care to infant trespassers when
he creates a pond on his land but does owe the duty when he piles junk thereon, since
the law is that a child does not necessarily appreciate the danger of being crushed by
heavy metal pieces. Compare Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 92 N.E.2d 632 (Ind.
1950) with Borinstein v. Hansbrough, 119 Ind. App. 134, 82 N.E.2d 266 (1948).
30. See note 9 supra.
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sively have been eliminated by a lock when the device was not in use, rail-
roads have not escaped liability.3 1 Holstine v. Director General of Railroads
2
illustrates how a consideration of this element will prevent recovery in a proper
case. There a child was attracted by a pile of sawdust beside a regular right
of way and was struck by a moving train after wandering on the tracks. The
defendant was held not liable because the court felt that to grant recovery
would be an unreasonable restriction on the beneficial use of property.3
In contrast is the case already mentioned where the child was killed while
collecting grain on a siding where children played.34 An inspection at that
spot would not have been too costly a burden on the railroad.
It is on this economic element that the Plotzki case should have been
considered and decided."3 Probably most artificial ponds where the expense
of child-proofing would be impractical serve a purpose so highly beneficial to
the landowner as to render the risk not unreasonable. 86 However, the Plotzki
complaint showed that the pond there was not serving any evident useful
purpose to the defendant. It could have been made unattractive by pouring
oil into it. It could have been fenced at no great expense; a requirement
of fencing around small areas has been applied in other Indiana cases where
the danger was no greater.
3 7
31. In Indiana H. B. R.R. v. Jones, 220 Ind. 139, 41 N-E.2d 361 (1941), a complaint
was held to state a cause of action in alleging that a child was crushed by a falling door
with a faulty lock while he was playing in a sided railroad car. And in cases not involving
railroads the landowner's neglect to keep up his premises has been an important factor
in establishing liability. See Harris v. Indiana G. S. Co., 206 Ind. 351, 189 N.E. 410
(1931) (a short-circuit on a high tension tower) ; Drew v. Lett, 95 Ind. App. 89, 182 N.E.
547 (1932) (poison. gas allowed to collect in an abandoned mine shaft); Indianapolis v.
Williams, 58 Ind. App. 447, 108 N.E. 387 (1915) (hole in stream bed washed out by the
drainage from a sewer outlet above) ; Cincinnati & H.S. Co. v. Brown, 32 Ind. App. 58,
69 N.E. 197 (1903) (strands of barbed wire among underbrush on abandoned lot). The
existence of a dangerous condition which does not serve any beneficial purpose tends
toward liability. See, e.g., Drew v. Lett, supra; Cincinnati & H.S. Co. v. Brown, supra.
32. 77 Ind. App. 582, 134 N.E. 303 (1922).
33. Id. at 593, 134 N.E. at 307. Cf., Indianapolis Motor Speedway v. Shoup, 88 Ind.
App. 572, 165 N.E. 246 (1928).
34. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry v. Means, 59 Ind. App. 383, 104 N.E. 785 (1915),
petition for rehearing denied, 59 Ind. App. 412, 108 N.E. 375 (1915).
35. The two dissenters in the Plotzki case, Emmert, C. J., and Gilkinson, 3., directed a
large part of their argument toward this element. Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co. of Ind.,
92 N.E.2d 632, 634-645 (Ind. 1950) passin.
36. Courts in other jurisdictions have expressly pointed this out in denying liability
for the drowning of an infant trespasser. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Huidekoper, 27 App. D. C.
154, 159-164 (1906); Bass v. Quinn-Robbins Co., 216 P.2d 944, 948 (Idaho, 1950);
Stendal v. Boyd, 73 Minn. 53, 56-57, 75 N.W. 735, 736 (1898) ; Thompson v. Illinois C.
R.R., 105 Miss. 636, 650-652, 63 So. 185, 186-187 (1913).
37. Indiana courts have not felt that a requirement of fencing was an unreasonable
burden on land ownership in the following cases: South Bend v. Turner, 156 Ind. 418,
60 N.E. 271 (1900) (open manhole) ; Penso v. McCormick, 125 Ind. 116, 25 N.E. 156
(1890) (pile of hot ashes) ; Borinstein v. Hansbrough, 119 Ind. App. 134, 82 N.E.2d 266
(1948) (junk yard). But if the danger is slight and only temporary, there is no duty
to fence it. Anderson v. Reith-Riley Construction Co., 112 Ind. App. 170, 44 N.E.2d 184
NOTES' -
The Plotzki case illustrates a weakness in the traditional statement of the
attractive nuisance doctrine. The propensity of courts to attempt abstractly
to rule that particular conditions may and others may not be "attractive
nuisances,' 38 coupled with a fear that to once allow recovery for an infant
drowning is to impose liability in every such instance, perhaps even where a
natural pond is involved, has led to a questionable crystalization in the tort
law of Indiana." But the fear of strict liability-advanced by some as a
reason for repudiating the attractive nuisance doctrine 4 -- is justified only so
long as the mistaken idea of "nuisance" (which implies strict liability)
pervades the opinions.41 The attractive nuisance cases, regardless of labels,
are properly in the area of "negligence," where liability flows only from
unreasonable conduct depending on the circumstances of each case.
4 2
TAXATION OF ROYALTIES RECEIVED BY THE EMPLOYED
INVENTOR
When the owner of patents or inventions transfers them in exchange for
royalties, the return in excess of basis is considered for tax purposes a capital
gain rather than ordinary income.' However, certain qualifications to this
rule stand ready to frustrate the quest for favorable capital rates. There must
(1942). Insulation of electric wiring at certain places is required by statute in Indiana
although it involves some expense. IND. STAT. ANN. § 20-304, (Burns 1950 Repl.).
38. See 9 ORE. L. Rav. 190, 191-192 (1930).
39. The Plotzlki case should be compared with the following recent cases in other
jurisdictions in which a landowner was held liable for an infant drowning: Saxton v.
Plum Orchards, 215 La. 378, 40 So.2d 791 (1949); Gimmestead v. Rose Bros. Co., 194
Minn. 531, 261 N.W. 194 (1935) ; Williams v. Morristown, 222 S.W.2d 607 (Tenn. App.
1946) (on demurrer), modified 189 Tenn. 124, 222 S.W.2d 615 (1946) ; Angelier v. Red
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